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11 
THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION'S CONSITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT 
Jacob Ziemann 
Like many regional or global schemes of governance, the European Union has been 
criticized as lacking legitimacy because it appears less deliberative, democratic, and 
participatory than natio nal governments (Nagel, 2005, Rabkin, 2005, Dahl, 20(6). This 
broad criticism applied to the EU is often characterized as a "democratic defi cit". The 
possible existence of a democratic deficit in the EU has been a growing concern of 
politicians, academics, and citizens since the process of European integration began. For 
example, remedying the democratic defi cit is regularly cited as one of the main reasons for 
creating and ratifying the Constitutional Treaty. It is not surprising then that before and after 
the recent defeats of the European constitutional project, with referendum 'no' votes in 
France and Holland, debate on the democratic deficit has been lively. T his paper attempts to 
make sense of the debate about the existence of the democratic deficit in the EU and to 
detai l som e of the policy proposals for constitutional reform that are a product of the debate. 
I will show that the democratic deficit debate has generated compell ing proposals about the 
direction that future constitutional developments in the EU should take. 
Since tllis paper amounts to a survey of the current state of the democratic defi cit 
debate every effort will be made to select the most compelling recent arguments in the 
debate. Drawing on the literature generated in this debate, the first section of this paper 
articulates a central case for the existence of a democratic deficit in the EU. I will refer to 
this argument as the democratic deficit thesis . The next section examines the arguments of 
the opponents of the democratic defi cit thesis. The third section attempts to identify the 
remaining real points of contention between the two sides of trus debate. T he final section 
of the paper surveys some of the sets of policy proposals for refornling the European Union 
that are a product of the ongoing democratic deficit debate. 
THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT THESIS 
A single definitio n for the democratic deficit doesn't exist. The definiti on varies 
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immensely depending on the nationalities and intellectual positions of the conilllentators 
writing on European constitutional reform. The first systematic attempt to develop a 
'standard case' of the democratic deficit came from Joseph Weiler and his coauthors (Weiler 
et. aI., 1995). Tlus 'standard case' was m eant to be a set consisting of broadly used arguments 
by politicians, academics, and citizens. However, in recent debate this 'standard case' has been 
upgraded with the case outlined below consisting of five arguments for the existence of the 
democratic deficit, based on an analysis first compiled by Andreas Follesdal and SirHon Hix 
(2006,534). 
First, the creation of the EU by the M aastricht Treaty and earlier agreements 
advancing European integration have resulted in a general increase in executive power and 
a general decrease in national govermllents' control over the lawmaking process (Andersen 
& Burns, 1996). We will call this argument the 'strong national executives' argument. T he 
E uropean Union's institutional design is such that policy-making at the EU level is 
donunated by executive actors . Executive actors take the form of national nunisters in the 
E uropean Council and national government appointees in the Commission. This contrasts 
with the structure of European national governments, where the government is usually 
accountable to voters through the actions of a parliament. The parliament holds the 
executive accountable by criticizing the behavior of the rninisters that make up the 
government and can, in extreme situations, remove the government from power. Having 
policy-making in EU donunated by executive actors is not in itself a fault but it is 
problematic when the actions of the executive actors cannot be controlled by national 
parliaments. Executive actors at the E U level are simply more isolated from national 
parliamentary scrutiny and control 'than government nunisters at the national level. Because 
of the way policy making in the EU is structured it is easier for executive actors to ignore 
the wishes of their national parliaments which has led to an increase in executive power at 
the expense of national parliaments. 
This first problem, in theory, should be partially rem edied by the existence of the 
E uropean Parliament. Yet, the second argument advances that the European Parliament is 
too weak to rein in executive actors in the EU. We will refer to tlus argument as the 'weak 
European Parliament' argument. After Maastricht it became clear that national parliaments 
were losing power relative to executive institutions. In response some scholars like Lodge 
argued that the power of the European Parliament must increase relative to the Council and 
the Comnussion (1994). While it is true that the European Parliament has becom e 
progressively more powelful through successive reforms it is still possible to c1ailll that it is 
weak compared to the executive actors in the Council. For example, the governments in the 
Council still get to set the legislative agenda by appointing the Comnussion.Also, while the 
European Parliament can veto the national governments ' cho ice for Commission president 
and commissioners we can't really argue that the European Parliament elects these officials. 
When it comes to spending, the European Parliament can only anlend lines that the 
governments in the Council have labeled 'non-compulsory' spending. Finally, even the 
procedure of co-decision, which officially provides equal power of legislation between the 
Council and the Parliament, does not actually allow the Parliament that much real power in 
legislating. This is the case because the majority of legislatio n is still passed under the 
consultation procedure which does not allow the Parliament full veto power (Follesdal & 
Hix, 2006, 535). Despite years of reforms to strengthen the European Parliament, arguably 
the most participatory institution in the EU and the only directly elected body, it is still 
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simply too weak relative to the Commission and Council. 
T he third argument in the democratic deficit thesis we will call the 'accountability' 
argument since it deals with the lack of democratic accountability found in the European 
Union. Setting aside the elections for the European Parliament, there are no direct European 
electi ons. C itizens in the EU inste~ld elect their national governments who then sit in the 
Council and nominate commissioners. Yet, even the election of the European Parliament 
does not produce democratic accountability because these elections are not about the 
direction of the EU policy agenda or the politicians and parties opera ting at the European 
level (Hix, 1999, 103). European Parliament elections are mostly about domestic issues not 
about EU policy's direction. National elections are also only fought on domestic issues not 
European issues. Since there is not a European elem ent in national and European Parliament 
elections citizens are unable to effectively influ ence the policy agenda of the EU by 
expressing their preferences . The nature of current elections in the European Parliament and 
the second-order accountability of the Conunission and Council both lead to a situation 
w here the officials operating in EU institutions are only marginally accountable to citizens. 
T he fourth argument we will call the 'distance' argument and it revolves around EU 
institutions being too distant or removed from voting citizens.We have already discllssed that 
electoral control over the Council and the ConU11ission is too far rem oved but there is a 
more basic sense in which the EU is distant from its citizens. The institutions of the EU are 
very difl:e rent from national democratic institutions, and therefore, citizens have difficul ty 
understancling the EU. Since they have difficulty understanding the E U they are unable to 
examine the EU and decide whether it is democra ti c or not. There are a number of 
examples of how EU institutions are radically different from domestic institutions, and 
therefore, more difficult to understand. Take the Council , which conducts legislative business 
in secret but executive business in the public sphere. The Commission is not elected but 
appointed through a complex procedure. The policy creation process in the Council , the 
Commission, and the Parliament is also fundamentally technocratic rather than political 
(Wallace & Smith, 1995, 138). From the perspective of an EU citizen, the European Union's 
institutions are highly foreign and complex which creates a situation where participation , 
deliberation , and expression of preferences by a citizen are challenging. 
The final argument, which we will call the 'drift' argument, posits that the EU adopts 
policies which d rift away from citizens' real policy preferences. It also argues that the EU 
ends up adopting policies that are not supported by a majority of voters or even a maj ority 
of m ember states. This happens because of the four arguments listed above but it also occurs 
because govenU11ents are able to pass policies at the European level that they could not find 
domestic support for. This critique is most notably developed by social democratic theorists, 
like Scharpf, who argue that the policy outcomes of the EU decision making process are 
usually right of domestic policy status quos (1999). H e supports tlus argument by claiming 
that at the domestic level governments are constrained by courts, parliam ents, and interest 
groups but at the European level many of these constraints are absent, poorly organized, or 
less powerful (1999). T he final part of the 'drift argument' argues that EU policy tends to be 
m ore skewed towards the interests of the owners of capital since businesses find it easier to 
coordinate their lobbying efforts at the European level since their interests are more 
concentrated. This compares to trade unions and consumer groups which have more diffuse 
interests that are m ore difficult to org;lIuze at the European level for effective lobbying. It is 
worth noting that the 'drift argument' is the only component of the democratic deficit thesis 
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which is supported by pointing to evidence of flawed policy outcomes instead of a flawed 
policy creation process. 
RESPONSE TO THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT THESIS 
There are a wide variety of responses to the democratic deficit thesis arguments 
presented above. Giandomenico Majo ne was the first scholar to systematically attack certain 
argmnents of the democratic deficit thesis and claim that the EU was not in a state of 
democratic deficit but is only perceived by its citizens as democratically illegitimate because 
it lacks credibility (1999). R ecently, Andrew Moravcsik has attacked the democratic deficit 
thesis from a different starting point than M aj one. I believe Majone's and Moravcsik 's 
responses taken together constitute the most persuasive argument against the democratic 
deficit thesis. 
Majone views the EU as primarily a 'regulatory state' (1996). A 'regulatory state' 
attempts to address market failure and does so by creating policies which produce outcomes 
that are Pareto efficient. Tlus contrasts with natio nal governments in the members states 
which also deal with policies that are distributive or redistributive in outcome. M,uone 
believes that the m ember states have intentionally delegated their regulatory power to the 
European level by creating the EU (1993). Some examples of this delegation can be seen in 
the creation of the common market, the making of monetary policy by the ECB, and the 
standardization of health and safety rules. Majone believes that these regulatory policies were 
intentionally isolated from domestic majoritarian government because the best policy 
outcomes are achieved on these issues when policy making is isolated trom popular pressure 
(1994). Through his perception of the EU as a 'regulatory state' M ajone weakens the 'strong 
national executive' argument of the dem ocratic deficit thesis. 
With this view of the EU· in mind Majone can also dismiss the 'distance' and 
'accountability' arguments of the democrati c deficit thesis. If EU policy making was made 
more accountable to citizens or decreased its complexity then policy outcomes would cease 
to be Pareto efficient. This is the case because allowing m ore participation and 
accountability would allow the political majority to select policy outcomes that may run 
counter to the political minority or the long term interests of the majority (Majone, 1994) . 
So in Majone's view the 'distance' and 'accountabili ty' arguments are actually assets for the 
EU since the EU is able to generate outcomes which national majoritarian parliaments 
cannot achieve subject to greater participation and accountability from citizens. 
Taking this line of reasoning one step further Majone dispatches the 'weak European 
Parliament' argument by claiming that an EU dominated by the European Parliament or a 
directly elected ConUlussion would end up politicizing regulato ry policy-making (1998). 
Politicization would lead to policy outcomes which were redistributive and not just Pareto 
efficient (1998). If policy-making at the EU became politicized the EU would become even 
more illegitimate since its main reason for existing, to isolate regulatory decisions from 
public pressure to achieve Pareto efficient policy o utcomes, would cease to exist. So the 
weakness of the European Parliament decried by the 'weak European Parliament' argument 
also turns o ut to be an asset for the EU if we believe that the EU is predominately a 
' regulatory state'. 
While Majone's reasoning does appear to defeat the democratic deficit thesis it is 
dependent on the normative and empirical claim that the EU is predonunately a 'regulatory 
state' . If we believe that the EU does and should playa role in crea ting policies that lead to 
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redistributive policy outcomes then M aj one's argument weakens considerably. Yet, it is also 
worth noting that Majone, even in the absence of a democratic deficit, supports refo rrns to 
make the EU more credible with the public like increases in policy making transparency 
and improving the quality ofEU legislation (2005). H owever, it is still difl:lcult to ignore the 
fact that Majone's attack on the dem ocratic defici t thesis relies on a rather constrained 
perception of the European Union's purpose and legitimate policy portfolio. We will next 
examine Moravcsik 's argument against the democratic deficit thesis which does not 
necessarily need the ' regulatory state' foundation. 
Moravcsik 's critique of the democratic defi cit thesis is the most extensive critique 
existing ill the literature and touches o n all five of the democratic deficit arguments. In a 
series of papers M oravcsik (2002b, 2004, 2005b, 2006a, & 2006b) seem s to provide 
satisfactory answers to m ost of the dem ocratic deficit arguments. 
In response to the 'distance' argument, Moravcsik argues that the E U policy making 
process is far more transparent than the policy making process in the domestic governments 
of m ember states (2004, 17-18). According the M oravcsik, the EU has gone out of its way 
to make it easier for citizens to access documents or information rela ted to EU policy 
making so they are not so confused as to be unable to fonn preferences on EU policy (2004, 
18). He argues it is now much easier to get information on the policy making process at the 
EU level compared to the dom estic leveL H e also claims a number of safeguards exist to 
scrutinize the policy making process, even if it is technocratic, like the European Court of 
Justice, the European Parliament, national parliaments, and national courts (2004, 19-20). 
Moravcsik thinks the sum of the aforementioned reasons makes a strong case for the EU to 
be viewed as an institution which is transparent and close to the citizens. 
When Moravcsik turns his attention to the 'drift' argument, raised by social democrat 
scholars, he finds no evidence that the EU lacks dem ocratic legitimacy because " its policies 
are biased against particular interests that are consensually recognized as legitimate" (2004 , 
21). M oravcsik claims that there is little to no evidence that regulatory protection or social 
policies in Europe are being eroded as a result of an alleged neo-liberal bias in the European 
Union's policy nu king (2004,22). Furthermore, M oravcsik points to the empirical claim 
that the level of social welfare provision in Europe has remained relatively stable throughout 
the process of European integration (2004,22). H e also sees the 'drift ' argument as null since 
the £actors that drive increases in social spending are dom estically specific and not occurring 
at the EU level in a uniform manner (2004, 23). H e finally concludes that the European 
Union's policies adequately reflect "patterns of consensus and contestation" within the 
bodies of citizens in the EU member states (2004,24). 
Aside from examining the outcomes of EU policy to attack the 'drift' argument 
Moravcsik also points to the institutio nalized process constraints in the EU that prevent 
drift . The elaborate checks and balances built into the structure of the EU ensure that an 
overwhelming consensus is required for any policy to be passed (2005b, 4 & 2002b, 6). Take 
for example, the requirement of unanimity for reform of treatises followed by either 
majority in the Conunission plus a qualified majority in the European Parliament or 
unanimity in the CounciL Add on top of those checks judicial review by the European 
Court of Justice and national courts and it begins to look very difl:lcult for passed legislation 
to drift away from the majority viewpoints. So Moravcsik doesn't believe that any single 
group of private interests can dominate the policy m aking process (2004,19). This is also the 
case because minority viewpoints are consciously solicited by the Commission which 
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actively seeks to listen to groups with diffuse interests. Groups with difiuse interests also have 
access to policy makers in the Council and the European Parliament. 
The 'strong national executives' argument is also dispatched by Moravcsik through an 
argument that national executives are still the most directly accountable politicians in the 
member states (2002b, 8). He argues that the "democratically elected governments of the 
Member States, which dominate the still largely territorial and intergovernmental structure 
of EU" are an important channel for creating democratic accountability at the EU level 
(2002b, 8). Basically, he is arguing that the EU does strengthen the national executives that 
play dominant roles in EU institutions, but the 'executive argument' of the democratic 
deficit thesis is not problematic because these national executives are still democratically 
controlled by their domestic voters and parliaments. 
In response to the 'weak European Parliament' , Moravcsik agrees that this was a 
problem in the past but claims it no longer is. The EU, according to Moravcsik, has already 
properly addressed potential imbalances of power among its institutions by significantly 
increasing the powers of the European Parliament (2005b, 5). For example, the EP now 
oflicially has veto-power over the selection of the Commission and is exercising tlus power 
more frequently. Reforming the co-decision procedure in the Amsterdam Treaty now means 
that legislation cannot be passed under co-decision unless a majority is found in the Council 
and the Parliament. However, Moravcsik doesn't appear to fully defeat the 'parliament 
argument' since the consultation procedure can still be used to pass legislation, efIectively 
bypassing the co-decision procedure which would involve the Parliament. 
In response to the lack of EU elections, what we referred to earlier as the 
'accountability' argument, Moravcsik advances his strongest case against the democratic 
deficit thesis. Moravcsik rejects the prenuse that more opportl1luties for direct participation 
in public deliberation · will autoinatically lead to increased popular support for EU 
institutions (2005b, 5 & 2006, 222). He doesn't believe that more opportl1luties to 
participate will cause citizens to participate more (2006, 223). He also doesn't think such 
participation will bring ahout more informed deliberation about the direction of the EU 
policy agenda hy the voters (2006, 228). Finally, he doesn't think that more informed 
deliberation on the part of citizens necessarily improves the political legitimacy of the EU 
or the trust that citizens have in the EU as an institution (2006, 233).To prove this final point 
Moravcsik looks at polling data about institutional trust to argue that publics in advanced 
democracies generally like and trust insulated institutions like arnues, police forces, 
constitutional courts, and independent central banks more than legislatures (2006, 32 & 
2004,24-25). Once again it is shown that the 'accountability' argul11.ent may actually be an 
asset since its operation in the EU insulates policy portfolios that citizens feel are best 
insulated from popular pressure. 
Moravcsik also mounts a second strand of attack on the 'accountability' argument by 
clainung that EU legislative policy portfolios are concentrated in issues of low salience to 
European voters (2004,25). Therefore, any efiorts to expand the forums for participation, 
like more EU offices selected by elections, is unlikely to overcome apathy (2004, 25). 
Moravcsik lists the five most salient issues, according to polls, in most EU members as health 
care provision, education, law and order, pension and social security policy, and taxation 
(2005b, 5). According to Moravcsik, none of these issues is a competency for the EU (2005b, 
6). He concludes that it is possible that voters just choose to remain rationally ignorant about 
the EU agenda because the issues it touches are not important to them (2006a, 230). For 
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this same reason Moravcsik argues that European Parliament elections do not work and will 
not be contests about the EU agenda anytime soon (2002b, 11). European Parliament 
elections become about domestic politics because only domestic issues are salient enough 
to mobilize popular support during an election. So ultimately, more political contestation 
through elections will not make the EU more democratic, according to Moravcsik, because 
"lack of salience, not lack of opportunity, may be the critical constraint on European 
political pal-ticipation (2004,24)". 
POINTS OF CONTENTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DEBATE 
By the process oflaying out the fullest response to the democratic deficit thesis in the 
previo us section we have already covered most of the main points of contention. However, 
three major points of contention still seem to separate the two sides of this debate. First, we 
must question Majone's main contention that the EU is a 'regulatory state' (1999). Majone 's 
theoretical assumption that purely Pareto efi"icient policies with no redistributive effects may 
on normative grounds be isolated ti-om democratic accountability is correct. However, as 
Hix and Follesdal point out, the problem comes at the empirical level since the "empirical 
reality of decisions is a continuum between policies that are predominately efficient and 
policies that are predominately redistributive, with many mixes (2006,542)". On one side 
of the continuum we have judicial decision and technical decisions about products which 
are at the efficient extrem e. On the redistributive extreme we have EU expenditure policies. 
In between these two extremes the bulk of EU policy making occurs, like the construction 
and regulation of the market, competition policies, and interest rate policies. Furthermore, 
Hix and Follesdal emphasize, that at the individual level the winners and losers from 
redistributive polices are nl.Uch more apparent (2006,543). For example, farmers, depressed 
regions, and researchers are net winners because they receive large amounts of the EU 
budget as a percentage of their income. Taxpayers at the individual level who pay into the 
EU budget receive widely varying amounts of net-benefit or net- loss from EU expenditures 
policies. Majone may wish that all EU regulation was only purely Pareto efficient.Yet, many 
EU regulatory policies have identifiable winners and losers Gorges, 1999)_ So M,~one 
appears to not be able to give a compelling reason why policies which are redistributive 
should be isolated from democratic contestation so he can not diminish the demands of the 
democratic deficit thesis for more responsive and accountable EU officials. 
The next two m ajor points of contention are raised by Moravcsik (2006). The first 
point of contention is detailed by Follesdal and Hix when they claim the "match between 
preferences and policies should not only occur as a matter of fact, but there should be 
mechanisms that reliably ensure that this power will indeed be so used (2006, 545)". 
Moravcsik uses empirical evidence to respond to the 'drift' and 'accountability ' argument to 
show that present policy outcomes created by EU institutions are acceptable to citizens. 
Based on tllls empirical evidence we can grant Moravcsik success in defeating the 'drift' 
argument that policy outcomes drift away from the preferences of the majority of voters in 
the EU. However, defense of institutions as democrati cally accountable must also show, 
according to Hix and Follesdal, that the institutions "can reliably be expected to secure more 
acceptable outcomes in the future than the alternatives considered" (2006, 545). For 
example, the institutions must be sufficiently responsive to the best interests of the voters. 
Moravcsik with his empirical evidence focusing on the acceptability of policy outcomes 
does not offer a response to the argument that the policy making process is unaccountable 
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to voters preferences, and therefore, cannot defeat the 'accountability' argument. However, 
Moravcsik can still argue that procedural constraints like oversized majorities and indirect 
control of EU officials by national parliaments may make it more likely that policy 
outcomes acceptable to the majority of citizens will still be reached. Essentially, this second 
point of contention shows that it is still highly contested whether or not the 'accountability' 
argument can be dismissed with only empirical evidence of outcome acceptability without 
showing that the policy creation m echanism will tend to secure the most acceptable 
outcomes to a majority of voters . 
The final remaining major point of contention centers on how voter preferences are 
determined. Follesdal and Hix argue that the key difference between democratic and non-
democratic institutions "is that citizens form their views about which policy option they 
prefer through a process of deliberation and party contestation that are essential elements of 
all democracies (2006, 545)". So if we follow Moravcsik's and Majone's concept of isolating 
certain arenas of policy making from public participation or deliberation we don't allow 
preferences to properly form among voters. This may explain why EU citizens see issues that 
the EU addresses as possessing low salience. The 'distance' and 'accountability' arguments 
prevent EU citizens from deliberating and participating in the policy making process so 
their preferences come out unformed or malformed. Basically, there is a serious 
disagreement in the democratic deficit debate about whether preferences and the salience 
of policy issues are formed endogenously to the policy making process or are fixed 
exogenously. This leads to a contentious disagreement between the two sides of the debate 
over whether the 'distance' and 'accountability' arguments are actually problematic for the 
EO. 
Given the three major poin~s of contention outlined above, the democratic deficit 
debate essentially appears to distill down to the democratic deficit thesis proponents arguing 
for a change in the EU to bring about a constrained form of democratic rule with more 
popular participation and deliberation. In contrast their opponents, like Majone and 
Moravcsik, support some weak form of technocratic rule with far less participation needed 
from the public. 
PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
Out of this rich debate on the democratic deficit thesis many proposals for 
constitutional reform to fix aspects of the EU that appear democratically illegitimate have 
been suggested. This final section presents four sets of proposals although dozens more have 
arisen from the democratic deficit debate. 
First, there has arisen out of the democratic deficit debate a group of proposals to 
address the 'accountability' and 'distance' arguments of the democratic deficit thesis. This 
group of proposals attempts to provide the EU with issues to tackle which are more salient 
with voters. For example, Phillippe Schmitter advocates making the EU more redistributive 
by giving it more power in pensions and social security, giving it the power to be more 
supportive of immigrants and aliens, and allowing it to rebalance national welfare systems 
away from the elderly (2000) . Citizens would then be forced to reorient their attention in 
the direction of the EU agenda because the policy outcomes of the EU would be making 
them winners or losers. This would lead citizens to demand more elections of EU officials 
and actually nuke such elections about the direction of EU policy instead of second order 
national contests. According to Schmitter, expanding the powers of EU would in effect 
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increase deliberation, improve preference formation, and increase participation by voters in 
the EU since the EU would be dealing with high salience issues (2000). 
Moravcsik believes that following Schmitter's suggestion of making the EU more 
redistributive, and therefore, more salient in an attempt to increase deliberation, 
participation, and preference formation is a terrible idea (Moravcsik, 2004, 26). Moravcsik 
believes Schmitter presents a coherent scheme of reform directed at those that are most 
dissatisfied with the EU, namely the poor, less well educated, female, and public sector 
employees (2004, 26). However, such a program of reform would not work because it would 
result in "a higher level of political conflict, domestic and interstate, than Europe has seen 
in several generations and perhaps the collapse of the organization" as the losers end their 
willingness to participate in the process of European integration as a result of the reform.s 
(2004, 26). 
However, fixing the 'accountability' and 'distance' arguments by increasing 
participation brought on by increasing the number of high salience issues the EU addresses 
is not a program of reform without merit. For example, during Germany's EU presidency 
Chancellor Merkel has shown a willingness to mobilize public concern over climate change 
to try and re- launch the draft constitutional treaty (Williamson & Parker, 2007). Germany 
decided not to cut down the treaty but improve it. The topic of climate protection has been 
chosen as an obvious candidate for addition to the treaty because it is an issue of high voter 
salience (Williamson & Parker, 2007). These actions by Germany can be seen as an attempt 
to demonstrate the relevance of the European Union's policy making to the voters in hopes 
that they will participate in passing a revised draft constitutional treaty. So taking certain 
issues of high salience with voters and giving the EU the power to legislate on them may 
actually increase political participation by voters and partially fix the 'accountability ' and 
'distance' arguments. 
The second group of proposals for constitutional reform is found in the draft 
copstitution. As stated earlier, the European constitutional project was in part undertaken as 
a way to respond.to the arguments made against the legitimacy of the EU in the democratic 
deficit thesis. There are a number of items contained in the draft constitution that attempt 
to address the democratic deficit thesis. For exam.ple, it extends the power of co-decision to 
almost all policy areas. This addresses the 'strong national executives' and 'weak European 
Parliament ' arguments since the powers of the European Parliament dramatically improves 
as it becomes a truly equal partner in legislation with the Council during all policy making 
at the EU level. The draft treaty also requires the Council to meet in public when legislating, 
and therefore, addresses the 'distance argument' by nuking policy making less opaque and 
foreign to citizens. The draft treaty further address the 'weak European Parliament' argument 
by mandating that national parliaments receive info about new EU policy proposals with 
enough time to mandate ministers on how to vote in the Council. Perhaps, the most 
groundbreaking clause of the draft treaty is it gives national parliaments the ability to send 
back legislation to the Conmussion which the national parliaments believe is outside the 
scope of the European Union's policy portfolio as defined by previous treaties. This goes a 
long way towards remedying the 'strong national executives ' and 'weak European 
Parliament' arguments. Finally, the draft contains a clause which requires the Conmlission to 
consider any proposal for legislation which has the support of 1 nullion EU citizens. This 
reform starts to dispatch the 'drift' and 'distance' arguments. However, with the Dutch and 
French 'no ' votes to the draft constitution there has been a debate about whether the 
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constitutional draft was too bold in its reforms or not revolutionary enough. The German 
govermnent, the current holders of the EU presidency in the Council, has made it known 
that it will not remove clauses from the draft constitution but attempt to add bolder reforms 
as it attempts to re-Iaunch the draft constitution (Williamson & Parker, 2007). 
The final two sets of proposals for constitutional reform are diametrically opposed 
when it comes to the future direction of reform to the EU. The third set of proposals sees 
the failure of the draft constitution as a sign that the current constitutional arrangem ents are 
sufficient and the EU is for the m ost part already democrati cally legitimate. The fourth set 
of proposals supports the current EU presidency's position by arguing that bolder reforrns 
are needed for the constitution beyond those contained in the draft constitution if the 
democratic deficit is going to be remedied. 
The third set of proposals favor drastically cutting down the dratt constitution if it is 
going to be relaunched or allowing the draft to die. M oravcsik has been a strong advocate 
of maintaining the current constitutional status guo (2006, 238). Keep in nl.ind that he 
argues that even if elem ents of the democratic deficit exist they are not problematic. He 
argues that holding the EU up to a standard of direct majoritarian democracy is 
counterproductive and im practical (2006, 238). This is the case because no m odern 
democracy meets this standard and no modern democracy aspires to do so. According to this 
viewpoint, m any elements of the EU that are attacked in the democratic deficit thesis are 
ac tually assets to the EU given the low salience of the issues the EU legislates on and the 
intentio nal isolation of certain portfolios in the EU from politicization. According to 
Moravcsik, those supporting a final constitutional settlem ent for Europe or the draft 
constitution, erroneously believe that public participation and deliberation are ends in 
themselves and are the sole source' oflegitim3cy (2006,238). H e argues that the view that 
the E U suffers from a democratic deficit compared to its member states comes from the fact 
that the EU deals with issues that are also commonly delegated and insulated in the member 
states' dom~stic political scenes (2006,239). Those advocating the third set of proposals for 
constitutional reform essentially defend the status guo. T hey see the failure of the draft 
constitution as a demonstration of Europe's success and stability. To sununarize, according to 
M oravcsik, they see in the failure of draft constitution " the stability of both the substantive 
and institutional dimensions of the current constitutional settlement" (2006, 236). 
The fourth and final set of proposals attempt more dramatic reform of the 
constitution in an effort to increase political contestation in all the institutions of the EU. 
For example, proponents of this path, like Follesdal and Hix, advocate more political 
contestation as essential for preference formation among voters and for the exercise of 
accountability over officials at the EU level by voters in the EU (2006, 548-50). To bring 
about an increase in political contestation they propose increasing the power of the 
European Parliament to allow the political parties that are forming in the Parliament to 
politicize the policy making process further. They also propose more transparency in the 
Council in the form of allowing the media to report who proposed which policies, who 
proposed amendments, and who was on each side when the final vote was taken . This 
increased transparency would allow the public to hold governments responsible for their 
votes in the Council. 
Advocates of the fourth set of proposals, like Hix and Follesdal, argue that the 
Conmu ssion's role in setting the policy agenda needs to be open to contestation and 
criticism (2006,554). Furthermore, this viewpoint advances that an institutional mechanism 
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needs to be found fo r generating m ore debate and contestation about politics in the EU, 
not just debate about the EU as an institution. Hix and Follesdal propose opening up the 
presidency of the conUllission to political contestation as the simplest method of achieving 
tlus desired institutio nal mechanism . Hix proposes a direct electio n of the C ommission 
president by the citizens or the national parliaments (2002) . A less ambitious route would be 
to m ake the national executives in the Council all ow a more open battle for president of 
the conunission without further constitutional refo rm. It is thou ght by proponents of the 
fourth set of proposals that increased political contestation for the President of the 
ConU11ission would create m ore debate about the best policy agenda to r the EU am ong the 
citizens and offi cials in the EO. This reform, according to advocates of more radicJI refo rms 
than those proposed in the drJft constitution, would take an enormous step towa rds 
destroying the dem ocratic deficit in the EO. H owever, bolder reform of the European 
Unio n 's constitutio n makes sense if and only if we really believe that the elements of the 
EU w hich are described as undem ocratic are actually problematic. 
CONCLUSION 
I am most persuaded by the set o f proposals which attempt more dramatic reform of 
the constitution in an effo rt to increase political contestation. Wlule I think there are strong 
countera rguments against the ' weak European Parliament Argument' and the 'strong 
natio nal executive ' elem ents of the democratic deficit, the 'distance ' and 'accountability' 
arguments have, in m y opiluon, not been adequately countered . For this reason I tend to 
favor the proposals fo r constitutional reforms that present m echanisms for increasing 
political contestatio n. I think only lllore contestation in the European Union 's policy 
niaking and leadership contests will make the public truly begin to deliberate, participate, 
and hold EU policy makers accountable. I don 't agree with MorJvcsik when he claims that 
preferences can be fo rmed exogeno us to the policy making process. In my mind issues will 
only become more salient to voters if they form preferences on the issues and preferences 
can only be formed thro ugh participation. There are mechanisms which will encourage the 
formatio n of preference and make EU policy portfolios more salient. T hese m echalusms 
should be implem ented . It is my opiluon that without the benefits wluch flow from further 
political contestation the EU will maintain the status quo of technocratic rule and continue 
to have a severe dem ocratic deficit . 
The contribu tio ns of the scholars discussed in this paper to formalizing and enriching 
the debate about the dem ocratic defi cit thesis have certainly led to many new proposals for 
refornung the constitution of the E uropean Union. We started by defining the dem ocratic 
defi cit thesis and then exanuned som e responses to the thesis. N ext, we tried to fl esh o ut 
the m aj o r remailung points of contention that exist in the democratic deficit debate: Finally, 
we exanuned four sets of proposals fo r further constitutional reform that have com e out of 
the dem ocratic deficit debate. A consensus on the future of constitutional reform in the EU 
or the existence of the democratic defi cit has not been reached and probably will never be 
achieved. However, it is clear that the direction of future constitutional reforms in the EU 
will b e heavily influenced by developments in the debate surrounding the existence of a 
dem ocratic deficit in the EO. 
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